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Abstract: The study focused on the early stage of Romania’s transition to the 
market economy during 1990-1992, based on statistical data available at that 
time. Because of the inherited structural distortions, the persistence of strong 
forces of inertia and the incoherence of economic and monetary policies, the 
transition to the market economy has been delayed in the early 1990’. In the 
absence of an adequate outline for de-monopolization and privatization of the 
economy, the liberalization of prices did not lead to an efficient resources 
allocation; on the contrary, the structural imbalances between demand and 
supply have deepened. The fall in industrial output and its poor competitiveness, 
due to the dominant position of this sector, has pushed the whole economy into 
a severe recession. A more rigorous management of the reform program, based 
on realistic assessments of opportunities and resources, with the help of more 
investments, including by the increase in foreign investments, should foster 
structural adjustments towards improving industrial performances and 
implicitly smoothing the way to the market economy. 
Key words: economic growth, transitional economies, structural adjustments, 
industrial restructuring, privatization, foreign investments, informal economy. 
JEL classification: E20, E26, E60, L16, L60, O11, P20, P31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A revised English version of the study published under the same title in 
Marketization, Restructuring and Competition in Transition Industries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Marvin Jackson and Wouter 
Biesbrouck, Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, Vt. USA: Avebury. 
Series: LICOS studies on the transition in Central and Eastern Europe, 1995,  
p. 285-336. 
 2
Problems in the structure of Romania’s economy 
Early Stage of Transition: 1990-1992 
 
Lucian-Liviu Albu and George Georgescu 
Introduction 
The current structure of the Romanian economy is still marked by the 
distortions inherited from the old system, induced mainly by a forced 
industrialization in the past. These distortions have been amplified by the 
deepening of the economic crisis in the first years of transition, which, 
additionally, raised other imbalances and dysfunctions. 
The main macroeconomic indicators in 1990-1992 compared to 1989 
shows a severe deterioration as regards the GDP, industrial and agricultural 
output, investments and foreign trade, mainly exports. 
A high inflation rate, a sharp increase in unemployment and a diminishing 
standard of living have been also recorded. Other adverse effect of a structural 
nature has been the accumulation of raw materials and final products stocks 
leading to the occurrence of a huge financial blockage.  
Preliminary data for 1993 showed, however, signs of stopping the 
economic decline. In 1994, a real growth rate of GDP and the beginning of 
industrial recovery are expected in Romania. The main efforts in continuing 
the reforms should focus on undertaken more adequate structural adjustment 
measures, both at macro and microeconomic levels. 
In order to curb inflation, attenuate structural imbalances and stimulate 
positive adjustments, tight control of money supply and budget deficit, as well 
as the interest rate and exchange rate policies should be calibrated. The 
changes in industrial structure have to lead to international competitiveness 
increase as an essential prerequisite of external equilibrium recovery. 
In the years to come, the strengthening of the economy and of the 
domestic investments in Romania, together with an increase in foreign 
investments is expected to allow the acceleration of the privatization and the 
creation of a competitive environment. 
During the first years of transition to the market economy, Romania, as 
well as other Eastern European countries, faced sharp difficulties in its 
attempts to implement economic reforms and restructuring programs.  
The purpose of this study is to identify the main structural problems in 
Romania and proper modalities to foster adequate adjustments towards a 
market economy. In order to reach this target the study discusses the following 
main issues: macrosectorial changes; changes in the industrial sector; and 
macro and microeconomic structural adjustment measures. 
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The study focused on structural particularities of the Romanian economy 
at the starting point of transition: the path of macroeconomic indicators and of 
structural changes in GDP; structural shifts in industrial output and in input 
factors by sectors; the evolution of price-production relationships in industry; 
essential economic policy issues for accelerating the reforms and restructuring: 
financial and monetary adjustments; reorientation of exports; privatization and 
development of the private sector; recovery of investments. 
The study, based on available data at that time, showed that many 
structural adverse effects occurred during 1990-1992. Thus, a severe 
contraction of GDP, a sharp decrease in investments and foreign trade, 
together with high rates of inflation and unemployment were recorded. The 
most affected sector seemed the industry, which, due to its dominant position, 
had a negative impact on the whole Romania’s economy. The industry delay in 
adapting to the new economic environment has been caused mainly by its slow 
rate of privatization and restructuring, of marketization and demonopolization. 
The huge industrial conglomerates have not adapted their supply to both 
internal and external demand, but instead have raised excessively the prices. 
This improper way of surviving fuelled an explosion in the inflation rate and 
also generated the accumulation of huge stocks of unsold products leading to 
an extended financial blockage. 
In the final sequence of this study the main results focus on macro and 
microeconomic incentives and instruments which could really contributing to a 
coherent policy mix for an appropriate management of the transition in 
Romania. 
Background: Romania facing the transition process 
The collapse of socialism shock one more time the restless history of 
Eastern Europe. The changes which have been tried to convert the economic 
system in these countries have proved to be much more difficult than one 
would have expected. Confronted with the real problems of the transition, 
people’s enthusiasm in 1989 has grown blurred and the certainty shown by 
numerous experts has vanished. It has become dramatically obvious that clear 
theoretical concepts and significant experiences are missing that could foster 
the transition from an economy of command to a market one as fast as 
possible. 
In these confused circumstances basic questions have been raised: what 
type of market economy model and structures is desirable and possible to be 
achieved in former socialist countries? Is it true that within these countries 
there was not a systematic concern for a consistent theoretical background with 
the best modalities to manage the transition? The similitude of the concrete 
challenges that Eastern European countries are facing with, confirms many of 
the shared main difficulties in the structural and behavioural adaptation to the 
market economy. 
 4
The economy of command and the central administrative allocation of 
resources in Romania imposed a forced industrialization in seventies and 
eighties. At the same time, neglecting consumer goods production, agriculture 
and the tertiary sector created negative effects upon the efficient structuring of 
the economy. During the industrialization, heavy industry sectors were 
developed with priority (chemistry, oil processing and metallurgy). Romania 
became a net importer of energy and raw materials and thus, functionally 
dependent on the outside world. In 1989, the energy intensity was seven times 
higher than in the developed European countries, which points out the modest 
performances of the Romanian economy’s technological background. 
Additionally, the huge effort to repay the external debt in the eighties (about $ 
12 billion), mainly by achieving forced trade surpluses, based on import 
restrictions, at the expense of renewing and modernizing production 
equipments, have also a negative impact on consumption. 
The structure of the industry has been constructed without adequately 
having in view the international specialization and the selective development 
criteria, according to Romania’s comparative advantages. Many enterprises 
proved to be not competitive at the international level, their supply being not 
consistent sometimes even with the demand on the internal market. The 
arbitrary decisions of the economy’s command mechanisms led to the creation 
of huge conglomerates hard to be managed and with an excess of labour force, 
mainly in industry, underestimating the potential of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
Since 1985 the Romanian economy has been in an involution process. In 
the annual growth of GDP and labour productivity negative rates have 
emerged as a result of the structural crisis, as well as of the imbalances became 
chronic at the micro and macroeconomic levels. 
The harmful maladies of the socialist system and the inaccuracy of the 
diagnosis have made the reaction of the economy to the applied remedies 
inappropriate. The dilemma of transition seems to have been connected with 
the possibility, the degree and the speed of substitution of the old mechanisms 
with those specific to the market economy. Besides, there was a significant 
rigidity and inertia in changing the economic, social and technological 
structures, as well as human mentalities. Getting out of this dilemma obviously 
depends on the compromise between accepting the current difficulties and the 
welfare expected on the medium and long run. 
The inherited structural distortions generated by the former system, for all 
Central and Eastern European countries were identified and described by 
Jackson (1993) as follows: the over dimensioning of the industrial share in the 
economy; higher shares of industrial output in heavy and energy industries and 
smaller shares in light industry; higher energy and raw material consumption 
per unit of GDP; more air pollution per unit of GDP; larger average-sized 
enterprises; lower ratios of foreign trade to GDP; lower share of agricultural 
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exports in total exports; fewer exports and imports of invisibles in the balance 
of payments. Also, the trade within the ex-CMEA countries favoured the 
tendency for excess supply of the so-called ‘soft goods’ (machinery and 
production equipments) with a low quality level and therefore very difficult to 
sell on the world markets for “hard” convertible currencies. At the same time, 
it gave raise to a tendency for excess demand for the so-called ‘hard goods’ 
(petroleum, mineral raw materials, agricultural products) easily marketable for 
hard currencies. 
In the early 1990’s Romania embarked on a reform program with the 
essential goal to transform its economy from a centrally planned to a market 
one. Further on we will examine the main structural changes that have taken 
place in 1990-1992, trying to identify the factors with significant impact on the 
economy during transition an to find the appropriate modalities and steps 
which are possible to be undertaken for continuing the economic reforms. 
Macrosectorial changes 
 Examining structural changes on macro-sectors of the economy during 
the first years of transition could represent an important empirical prerequisite 
to formulate pertinent conclusions concerning current and future possible 
measures for successfully economic reforms and structural adjustments. 
Main economic indicators: recent trends 
 In 1990-1992, the development of the Romanian economy has been 
under the impact of various internal and external factors, most of them in an 
adverse manner. It became obvious that the decision-makers did not have 
adequate instruments for comparing the possible options in a rational manner. 
The economic agents and the population had, in most cases, an adverse 
reaction to the economic liberalization. 
Severe imbalances between sectors and economic activities have 
emerged, as well as acute shortages of financial and material resources, under 
the circumstances of an unfavourable international environment. The collapse 
of the CMEA, the Gulf war and the embargo on Yugoslavia deprived many 
Romanian companies of raw materials and external markets, which caused 
shocks and created damages to the national economy. 
Although through implementing reform measures since December 1989 
restructuring steps towards a market economy has been expected, the study of 
the main indicators showed a sharp deepening of the crisis (Table 1). 
In 1992, the GDP of Romania was about 30 percent lower compared to 
1989, in real terms. Among the sectors of the national economy, the fall of 
industry was the most dramatic. As compared to 1989, the industrial output 
decreased by 54 percent. It is estimated that the dominant share this sector hold 
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in the economy caused in fact that 85 percent of the total decrease in the GDP 
was due to the decline in industrial output (Grigorescu and others, 1993). 
Table 1 
Romania’s macroeconomic indicators in 1990-1992 
 
Real growth rates  
(as percentage against previous year) 
 
Indicators  
1990 1991 1992 
 
1992/1989 
(1989 = 100) 
 
Gross domestic product 
 
-5.6 
 
-13.0 
 
-13.6 
 
71.1 
Industrial output -23.7 -22.8 -21.9 46.1 
Agricultural output -2.9 +1.0 -13.6 86.7 
Exports -41.5 -4.0 +18.6 66.0 
Imports  +15.1 -29.0 +10.0 90.4 
Investments  -38.3 -25.8 -1.2 45.2 
Employment -1.0 -0.5 -3.0 95.5 
Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1993.  
Following the contraction of production that caused a severe decline in 
the foreign trade, mainly in exports, an increasing imbalance compared to 
imports occurred in Romania. Because of this imbalance an acute shortage of 
foreign exchange and strong pressures on the exchange rate surged. Due to the 
covering of the trade balance deficit by external financial assistance, the 
foreign debt increased, amounting in September 1993 to about $ 3 billion 
(National Commission for Prognosis, 1993). 
The monetary policy did not succeed in achieving the macroeconomic 
stabilization. The interest rates remained negative in real terms and the national 
currency depreciated more than 50 times in only four years. 
The foreign trade liberalization did not positively impact on raising 
competition because of the underdeveloped distribution systems. The absence 
of real competition has worsened the rift between prices and production in 
terms of lack of proper regulations sanctioning the monopolist practices. 
The price liberalization, instead of contributing to the setting real prices 
as basic prerequisites in restructuring the economy, freed the way for 
exacerbation of monopolist forces. The state-owned enterprises, which hold in 
many cases monopoly positions, have taken the chance of price liberalization 
for gaining a raise in revenues while their output declined.  
Under these circumstances, the inflationary process erupted, without any 
significant corrective adjustments in the price system. The consumer price rose 
about nine times in 1992 compared to 1989. At the same time, a significant rise 
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in unemployment was recorded, the number of unemployed exceeding one 
million persons in April 1993. 
The high inflation rates caused dramatic loss in the purchasing power of 
the population, having a harmful impact on its living standard. The real wage 
decreased by 24 percent in 1992. 
The structure of family budget expenditures showed that food products 
held about 60 percent of these expenditures in 1992. A survey of the Romanian 
Life Quality Research Institute estimated that 37 percent of the population 
dropped under the poverty line in 1993 (Barbu and Novak, 1993).  
The fall in population consumption and in living standard would have 
been more dramatic without increasing consumer goods imports, which instead 
has led to the rise in budget deficit and external debt. 
Unfortunately, the worst effect of the economic crisis, as well as the 
general instability of the economic and social background has been the drastic 
cut in investments, the essential driver in restructuring the economy. The share 
of investments in GDP dropped from 30 percent in 1989 to 15 percent in 1992, 
their volume decreasing in real terms during this period by 55 percent. 
Despite the increase in the fiscal deficit, respectively from 2 percent of 
GDP in 1991 to 4.8 percent of GDP in 1992, the national public budget had 
lesser potential to finance investments projects, even for the finalization of 
those started before 1989. The share of investments financed from the public 
budget in the total volume of investments decreased from 60 percent in 1989 to 
20 percent in 1992 (Government of Romania, 1993b). 
The public budget did not play its allocating role and a vicious circle has 
been created (high taxation ratio – decrease in revenues from taxes – raise in 
taxation ratio).  
On the one hand, the high level of the fiscal burden (38 percent in 1992) 
has diminished the investment potential of economic agents, which could have 
foster their development and therefore raising further the budget revenues.  
On the other hand, not even the investment programs of national interest 
could have been promoted through the public budget because the economic 
and social crisis was pushing the allocation of budget expenditures to subsidies 
and to sustain unproductive sectors. 
Other causes which could explain the weak performances of the 
Romanian economy and the lack of significant positive results of structural 
adjustments are related to difficulties faced at the microeconomic level 
revealed by the slow restructuring and privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
Well known foreign experts pointed out that, in Romania, the decline in 
production was due to the fall of investments, the reduction in the average 
number of working hours per week (from 44.2 hours in 1989 to 37.4 hours in 
1990 and to 35.9 hours in 1991), the dislocations caused by the reorganization 
of large enterprises and the weak management experience (Ben-Ner and 
Montias, 1991). 
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The adverse effects which occurred during the transition are not specific 
only to Romania. These could be observed, in forms more or less dramatic, in 
all ex-communist countries.  
Now, the economic science faces new challenges, having to explain the 
new developments in this part of the world and to identify appropriate 
measures for accelerating the transition to the market economy, minimizing the 
social costs and disturbances.  
It has become obvious that the economic situation in these countries 
represents a new type of crisis, whose typical feature is the conjunction 
between the consequences of the structural crisis of the old system with those 
generated by the transition crisis itself (Postolache, 1991). 
What is particular in Romania is the larger magnitude of these two crises 
and of their combination. It should be mentioned that the most optimistic long 
run scenario shows that the level of GDP recorded in 1989 could not be 
reached before 2005 (Raducanu, 1993).  
According to preliminary data for 1993, the economic decline should end. 
Despite the persistence of particular negative effects (consumer price index of 
300 percent, depreciation of the national currency more than three times, rise 
in unemployment to more than 10 percent, persistence of the financial 
blockage) the National Commission for Prognosis estimated that, in 1993, the 
GDP would be at the same level as in 1992.  
A real positive growth rate of GDP is expected to be achieved in 1994, 
when it foresees an increase by 1.5 percent and a beginning of economic 
recovery, mainly in the industry (NCP, 1993).  
The main points of the reform which are expected to have beneficial 
effects on the economic recovery are the privatization of more state-owned 
companies, the rebound of exports and investments, the mitigation of inflation, 
the introduction of financial discipline, the appropriate functioning of the 
market forces and, among these, of the foreign exchange market. 
Structural changes in GDP 
As previously mentioned, the GDP recorded a sharp decline during the 
first years of transition, primarily due to the severe drop in the industrial 
output.  
Observing the contribution of sectors to the GDP creation in 1992 
compared to 1989, both in current and constant prices, certain changes could 
be noticed (Table 2). These changes in the supply side of GDP are mainly due 
to the differences between price indexes within the economic sectors. 
The largest difference between constant and current prices has been 
recorded in the commerce sector. This can be explained by the highest price 
increase that witnessed this sector, due to the general price distortions, the 
sharp imbalance between supply and demand and the speculating opportunities 
for vendors created by the price liberalization. 
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Table 2 
The GDP structure in 1992 compared to 1989  
                                                   - percent - 
1992/1989 
(1989 = 100) 
 Structure of GDP 
(%) 
GDP Index 1992 
 
current 
prices 
constant 
prices 
 
Deflator 
 
1989 prices 
1989 
prices 
1992 
GDP 747.7 71.1 1051.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Industry (including 
households) 617.2 61.9 997.1 54.1 47.2 44.7 
Construction 594.5 72.0 825.7 5.5 5.6 4.4 
Agriculture and forestry 997.5 92.7 1076.1 14.1 18.4 18.9 
Transport and 
communications 630.1 54.0 1166.9 7.5 5.7 6.4 
Commerce 1542.9 68.7 2245.9 6.4 6.2 13.2 
Services 728.4 104.8 695.0 9.1 13.4 8.8 
Banking financial services 1866.4 159.4 1170.9 2.1 4.7 5.2 
Public administration 966.3 108.9 887.3 2.5 3.8 3.3 
Adjustment for inputted 
output of bank services  
(IOBS) 
2496.5 - - -1.4 - -4.8 
Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1993. 
 
The configuration on macro-sectors of the Romanian economy and the 
changes recorded since 1989 are far from representing a certain progress 
according to the historical trends of the developed world.  
The fact that, for instance, the services sector’ share in GDP stood at 37 
percent in 1992 does not reflect a progress in the economic development 
advance as a consequence of a real intra and inter-sectorial restructuring [1]. 
This change is, to a great extent, only apparent and could be explained more 
obviously by the different rates in the decline of sectors, mainly in industry.  
The National Commission for Prognosis estimated a relative decrease in 
the share of the tertiary sector beginning with 1994, according to the expected 
recovery of agricultural and industrial output (Table 3). 
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Table 3 
The GDP structure by main sectors of the economy  
           - percent - 
 1992 1993 
preliminary 
1994 
forecast 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 
of which:    
Primary sector 18.9 21.0 21.8 
Secondary sector  49.1 49.0 49.1 
      of which:    
      industry  44.7 44.9 45.6 
      construction  4.4 4.1 3.5 
Tertiary sector 36.9 34.7 33.8 
      of which:    
      Transport and  
communications 6.4 5.9 5.3 
      Trade  13.2 12.4 12.6 
      Other sectors 17.3 16.4 15.9 
Adjustment for inputted output 
of bank services (IOBS) -4.9 -4.7 -4.7 
 Source: National Commission for Prognosis, 1993. 
In terms of the changes in output, gross value added and intermediate 
consumption, as it could be observed from the data presented in Table 4, our 
calculations in constant and current prices allow drawing some relevant 
conclusions.  
First, the higher growth rate of gross value added during the period 1989-
1991 than the raise in the output and intermediate consumption, in comparable 
conditions of prices, both in the main sectors (industry and agriculture) and 
especially at the national economy level. 
Second, the price rises were more significant in intermediate 
consumption, due mainly to the greater extent of the monopolist positions in 
resource and material-intensive sectors which led to a faster rate in industry 
and agriculture. Because of the value added growth rate in the tertiary sector, 
this pace did not have the same impact at the national level.  
These two conclusions should be assessed in the context of considering 
the higher proportion of intermediate consumption in industrial output (73.5 
percent in 1991) and of the value added in the services output (54.1 percent in 
1991) [2]. 
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Table 4 
Indexes of output, gross value added and intermediate consumption (%) 
                                                        1991/1989 (1989 = 100) 
 Output Gross 
Value 
Added 
Intermediate 
consumption 
National economy    
      in current prices 265.3 287.8 253.2 
      in constant prices   74.1 82.7 69.4 
     deflator 358.0 348.0 364.8 
Industry     
      in current prices 240.8 227.0 246.2 
      in constant prices 66.2 66.5 65.9 
      deflator 363.7 341.3 373.6 
Agriculture    
      in current prices 370.4 367.0 373.9 
      in constant prices 106.1 128.8 81.1 
      deflator 349.1 284.9 461.0 
Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1993. 
The GDP structure by category of utilizations (Table 5) shows the 
growing share of the final consumption, both private and public. As mentioned 
before this increase does not reflect any positive change in the utilization of 
GDP. In fact, the main cause resides in the GDP decline and in the sharp 
decrease in gross fixed capital formation. The demand side of GDP shows also 
structural distortions i.e. the magnitude of stocks change (16.2 percent in 1992) 
and the high negative contribution of net exports (-7.7 percent in 1992). 
 
Table 5 
GDP by category of uses (%) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Gross domestic product, of which: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    Final consumption, of which:  70.5 79.2 75.1 76.6 
        final consumption of households  57.9 65.0 59.3 61.1 
        final consumption of general  
        government 11.7 13.3 15.1 15.0 
   final consumption of private non-   
profit institutions serving households    0.9 0.9 0.7 0.5 
  Gross fixed capital formation 29.9 19.8 14.3 14.9 
  Change in stocks -3.1 10.5 14.8 16.2 
  Net exports 2.7 -9.5 -4.2 -7.7 
Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1993. 
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Taking into account the effects of prices (deflators) on the GDP final use 
(Table 6) one can observe its higher levels in the case of households’ 
consumption. Clearly, that means that the population has been most affected 
by the economic crisis and structural imbalances. 
 
      Table 6 
Indexes of GDP by category of uses (1989 = 100) 
 1990 1991 1992 
Gross domestic product    
      index 94.4 82.2 71.1 
      deflator   113.6 334.4 1051.7 
Final consumption    
        index 108.9 96.3 89.2 
        deflator 110.7 304.2 911.3 
Final consumption of households    
      index 108.0 91.1 82.1 
      deflator 111.4 309.1 961.5 
Final consumption of general 
government    
      index 114.0 125.4 129.1 
      deflator 107.7 284.2 744.7 
Gross fixed capital formation    
     index 64.5 47.7 47.2 
     deflator 110.2 275.5 788.0 
Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1993. 
It is worth mentioning that the transition to a market economy implies 
essential changes both in statistical data and in accounting data systems. On 
the other hand, there are large debates concerning the dimension and the 
implications of the hidden economy [3]. There are also strong concerns 
regarding the external costs of economic development in terms of the 
evaluation of real impact of environmental damages [4].  
Changes in the structure of the industry 
The weak performances of the Romanian economy, the current crisis and 
imbalances that make more difficult to overcome this situation, are due, to a 
great extent, to the forced industrialization in the past. The over-dimensioning 
of the industrial sector and also its inefficient structures in relation with the 
domestic raw materials and energy resources, as well as with the national 
particularities, are found at the basis of the imbalances and has to be taken into 
account by the restructuring policy. 
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The industrial sector in Romania, compared to other countries, showed 
one of the highest shares in the national economy. But, it should be mentioned 
that the Romanian industry has grown artificially, being over-dimensioned to 
the detriment of the services sector. In terms of labour productivity, efficiency 
and competitiveness, the Romanian industry holds one of the lowest positions 
in Europe. 
Despite the general trend of decline after 1989, the industry’s share in the 
national economy continued to stand at high levels (Table 7). 
Table 7 
The share of industry in the national economy (%) 
Indicators  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994a 
Gross domestic product 54.2 50.7 43.3 44.7 44.9 45.6 
Outputb 63.3 59.5 57.4 - - - 
Intermediate consumptionb   69.7 68.9 67.6 - - - 
Gross value addedb 51.2 44.1 40.4 - - - 
Fixed assets 47.5 50.5 50.4 62.0 - - 
Investments  43.4 46.3 54.5 56.6 - - 
Employment (end of year) 38.1 37.9 35.3 31.6 30.3 29.6 
Employees  47.5 47.7 49.0 48.8 - - 
Total energy consumption   77.1 73.2 66.7 63.0 63.1 62.0 
Electric power consumption 70.3 65.6 61.7 57.0 68.5 67.0 
Exports (FOB) 99.3 98.9 94.5 94.3 - - 
Imports (CIF) 98.2 31.9 92.1 90.6 - - 
    a Forecast of NCP,1993. 
    b from National Accounts 
   Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1990,    
1991, 1992, 1993; and NCP, 1993. 
The output and prices in industry 
Among the sectors of the national economy, industry was the most 
affected by the crisis. Compared to 1989 the industrial production decreased by 
54 percent in 1992.  
At the same time, the rise in industrial prices was extremely severe and 
most unemployed workers were dismissed from industrial sub-sectors. 
Because of its high share, the industrial crisis has had major impact on the 
entire economy. 
The response of industrial sector to the new circumstances of transition 
mainly appeared as a fast rise in prices. So, in value terms, it was possible that 
the fall in the industrial output be compensated, to a large extent, by the raise 
in the price levels, which is reflected by the deflators (Table 8).  
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This type of response in the industrial sector was favoured by the slow 
rate of privatization, marketization, and demonopolization in Romania. As a 
consequence, a decrease in the industry’s share together with its restructuring 
represents basic conditions to shorten the transition duration [5]. 
Table 8 
Indexes of GDP, output, intermediate consumption and gross value added 
and deflators at the national economy level and in the industrial sector  
                                                                          (% against previous year) 
 Indexes 
current 
prices 
Indexes 
constant 
prices 
 
Deflator  
GDP    
   National economy    
1990 107.2 94.4 113.6 
1991 256.3 87.1 294.3 
1992 272.1 86.4 314.9 
1993a 349.7 1007 347.3 
1994 235.7 101.5 232.2 
   Industry     
1990 100.4 86.5 116.1 
1991 218.9 85.3 256.6 
1992 280.7 84.0 334.2 
1993a 351.1 100.6 349.0 
19934b 239.7 101.1 237.1 
Outputc     
   National economy    
1990 100.8 85.2 118.3 
1991 263.2 87.0 302.5 
   Industry     
1990 94.9 79.2 119.8 
1991 253.9 83.6 303.7 
   Extraction industry    
1990 92.2 65.7 140.3 
1991 270.8 84.3 321.2 
   Manufacturing industry    
1990 93.1 78.0 119.4 
1991 243.4 83.1 292.9 
   Electric and thermal energy, gas  
and water    
1990 118.4 102.7 115.3 
1991 346.6 87.7 395.2 
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Intermediate consumptionc    
   National economy    
1990 96.3 78.6 122.5 
1991 263.1 88.3 298.0 
   Industry    
1990 95.1 77.6 122.6 
1991 258.8 85.0 304.5 
     Extraction industry    
1990 96.2 82.8 116.2 
1991 300.4 92.4 325.1 
     Manufacturing industry    
1990 91.9 74.4 123.5 
1991 251.4 84.7 296.8 
    Electric and thermal energy, gas 
and water    
1990 127.5 106.8 119.4 
1991 299.5 85.3 351.1 
Gross value addedc    
   National economy    
1990 109.3 97.6 112.0 
1991  263.3 84.8 310.5 
    Industry     
1990 94.1 83.3 113.0 
1991 241.2 79.9 301.9 
    Extraction industry    
1990 88.0 47.7 184.5 
1991 236.6 75.1 315.0 
   Manufacturing industry    
1990 96.3 87.1 110.6 
1991 224.1 79.4 282.2 
   Electric and thermal energy, gas and  
   water    
1990 46.0 69.5 66.2 
1991 1394.5 141.2 987.6 
  a preliminary 
  b projections of CNP  
  c from National Accounts 
  Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1993; CNP, 1993. 
The available data showed that since 1989, despite the rise in output 
prices in industry, mainly because of producers’ monopoly position, and a 
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decrease in the average number of employees, the share of gross value added 
recorded a decline, alike other efficiency indicators (Table 9). 
The downward trend of the industrial output between 1989-1992, together 
with falling labour productivity and production capacity utilization, caused the 
decrease of raw materials and energy imports, the underutilization of the 
working time and the amplification of turbulences in financial relationships 
between economic agents. At the same time, the prices recorded an upward 
trend because of: 
1. the rise in prices of material inputs and in the cost of contracted 
credits; 
2. the increase in labour costs; 
3. the fall of investments, discouraging the improvements in labour 
productivity on the basis of equipments and technology renewal; 
4. the social pressures, limiting the remove of the workforce in excess. 
 
Table 9 
   Main economic indicators of industrial activities  
(% against the previous year)  
 1990 1991 1992 
Total output -23.7 -22.8 -21.9 
manufacturing industry -23.1 -23.8 -24.0 
extraction industry -27.4 -18.3 -0.9 
      electric and thermal energy -30.6 -9.4 -7.2 
Employment  -3.7 -7.5 -13.2 
Labour productivity per employee -25.1 -15.0 -13.4 
Energy efficiency  
    (production/energy consumption) -6.1 +2.9 -7.7 
Investments -37.3 -9.0 +6.4 
Share of value addeda  
 (percentage in industrial production) 28.1 26.5 39.8b 
Degree of production capacity use  
(% in total) 69.0 57.0 47.8 
a from National Accounts  
b ratio between the value added in industry and the industrial output  
Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1990, 1991, 
1992, 1993. 
These circumstances have lead to the rise of inflation, creating payment 
difficulties for buyers and, finally, to an artificial shift in the relationships 
between sectors affecting their contribution in industrial output. Moreover, at 
the end of March 1993, the stocks of unsold products stood at around lei 600 
billion, which showed a structural disequilibrium between supply and demand 
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in industry. The main share in total stocks was held by machinery and 
equipments (20.4 per cent), textiles (11.7 per cent), chemistry (15.5 per cent) 
and metallurgical products (14.2 per cent). 
The discrepancy between the output decrease in industry on the one hand 
and the prices increase, on the other hand, represented the main source of 
amplifying the inflationary pressures in the Romanian economy. In this regard 
it is worth examining the prices-output relationship in various industrial 
sectors, based on available data.  
The study of the output indexes and respectively the sale price indexes in 
the cases of industrial sectors has revealed a certain inverse correlation 
between these two variables (Table 10) [6]. 
 
Table 10 
Indexes of output and sale price indexes in industrial sectors 
 Output 
indexes  
(Dec. 1992    
% against 
1989 
monthly 
average) 
Rank  Sale 
price 
indexesa  
(Dec. 
1992  % 
against 
Oct. 
1990b) 
Rank  
Total industry 40.0 - 1,786.4 - 
Extraction and preparation 49.4 6 2,141.0 7 
Oil and natural gas extraction 72.9 2 1,511.5 15 
Metal ores extraction and 
preparation 45.0 
 
8 1,045.4 22 
Other extraction activities 35.3 18 2,105.2 8 
Food and drinks 43.5 9 1,435.5 17 
Tobacco products 67.7 3 743.4 25 
Textile and textile products 38.9 12 1,139.4 19 
Fabrics, furs and leather goods 33.5 19 784.8 24 
Footwear 38.8 13 1,292.8 18 
Wood Processing 32.3 20 1,894.8 11 
Pulp, paper and cardboard  28.4 24 2,025.6 9 
Oil processing, coking and 
nuclear fuel treatment 51.3 4 2,760.4 1 
Chemistry and synthetic and 
artificial fibres 39.5 11 2,282.1 4 
Rubber and plastics processing 32.0 21 2,396.3 2 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 31.5 
 
22 2,248.8 5 
Metallurgy 30.9 23 2,340.4 3 
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Metallic constructions and metal 
products 26.0 
 
25 1,829.8 14 
Machinery and equipments 36.5 17 1,484.0 16 
Computers and office equipments 39.7 10 135.1 26 
Electric machinery and 
appliances 36.6 
 
16 1,875.6 12 
Radio, TV sets and 
communication equipments 37.2 14 926.8 23 
Medical, precision, optical 
instruments and equipments and 
watches 27.7 25 1,062.7 21 
Road transportation means 36.8 15 1,925.9 10 
Other means of transport 45.6 7 1,852.3 13 
Furniture and other non-classified 
activities 50.8 
 
5 1,120.9 20 
Electric and thermal energy, gas 
and hot water production, 
transport and distribution 73.0 1 2,173.5 6 
 a for supplies to the domestic market  
 b October 1990 is the month of the first liberation of prices in Romania; before this month, 
practically, the level of prices was constant.  
 Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1993; 
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, no. 1, Bucharest, 1993. 
From the viewpoint of the above mentioned discrepancy, expressed by the 
ratio between the price index and the decrease in real terms of the output, the 
following industrial sectors stand out: electric and thermal energy, gas and hot 
water production, transport and distribution (15.9 times), oil processing, coking 
and nuclear fuel treatment (14.2 times); oil and natural gas extraction (11.0 
times); coal extraction and preparation (10.6 times); chemistry and synthetic and 
artificial fibres (9.0 times); rubber and plastics processing (7.7 times); and 
metallurgy (7.2 times).  
In fact, just these are the sectors where the degree of production 
monopolization and concentration is higher, the privatization is practically 
absent, the imports of raw materials and energy resources represent high shares 
in the production costs, ‘traditionally’ contributing (but in terms of doubtful 
efficiency) to the Romanian exports.  
After 1989, it was the share of these sectors which increased in industry, 
mainly due to the abuse of monopoly positions from the part of state-owned 
enterprises and, consequently, to the massive price increases without real 
coverage in production [7]. 
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Structural changes in industrial sectors 
Further, the main trends of a structural nature within industry and its 
sectors in 1990-1992 are presented. 
The extractive industry, which at the beginning of the transition witnessed 
a severe output decline, is the only sector which appears to recover in 1992. 
This was due exclusively to the lignite extraction (production increased by 20 
percent compared to 1991 and by 1 percent compared to 1990) its share 
exceeding the oil contribution to the total internal resources of primary energy 
(see Note [2]). 
The increase in coal imports in 1992 (+80.6 percent compared to 1991) at 
the same time with oil and natural gas output reduction (-23.9 percent, 
respectively -35.6 percent compared to 1991) also as an effect of the abolition 
of former CMEA trading system, made it possible for coal to become the main 
source for the production of energy. 
A sharp output decline has been recorded in the field of metallic ores 
extraction, with adverse effects upon the raw materials supply for the 
metallurgic industry, which holds about 15 percent of the country’s exports. 
The electric and thermal energy industry witnessed a moderate decline 
starting with 1990. In 1992, the share of electric power production in the 
thermal energy raised  to 78.4 percent compared to 75.0 percent in 1991 and 
also a structural change occurred in the consumption of fuels (43.2 percent 
coal and 45.8 percent natural gas, compared to 32.0 percent, respectively 51.9 
percent in 1991) (CNS, 1993). 
              Table 11 
Electric power balance (% against the previous year)  
 1990 1991 1992 
Resources  -11.8 -11.3 -8.4 
  Output  -15.2 -11.5 -4.8 
thermo electrical -15.6 -20.0 -0.4 
     hydro electrical -13.1 +29.8 -17.9 
  Imports   +21.3 -25.6 -37.2 
Consumption -14.1 -14.4 -9.0 
       in economy -16.4 -17.8 -11.8 
       household uses  +24.6 +26.0 +12.6 
Source: National Commission for Statistics, 1993. 
The sharp decrease in imports and domestic output after 1989 brought 
about the reduction of the electric power resources and consumption (Table 
11), mainly in industry (36,284 million kwh in 1992, compared to 44,533 
million kwh in 1990 and 55,574 million kwh in 1989). In 1992, the electric 
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power imports represented 7.5 percent of the total resources compared to 11.0 
percent in 1991, 12.8 percent in 1990 and 9.3 percent in 1989. 
The manufacturing industry concentrated the whole spectrum of the 
impact resulted from the failures of other industrial sectors and of the ones of 
the national economy, from the problems related to the transition and also to 
the unfavourable developments in the international environment.  
Therefore, ever since 1989 the production decline in the processing 
industry sectors has been the most severe, leading to the perpetuating and even 
deepening of the past imbalances, as well as to the surge of a high rate of 
unemployment. 
The food industry carried on its activity under the impact of the raw 
materials shortage, due to the adverse natural conditions of agricultural 
production. Under these circumstances, the food industry output decreased by 
18 percent in 1992 compared to the previous year and halved compared to 
1989. The fall of the domestic agricultural resources was counter-balanced 
only partially by the import of agro-food products, whose share increased 
starting with 1991.  
The sectors producing intermediate goods and for investments, 
dimensioned according to the energy-intensive structures derived from the old 
standards of specialized activities within CMEA and of industrialization 
policy, have been confronted, more acutely, with problems related to the loss 
of raw materials and energy supply sources and of the external markets of 
former socialist countries. At the same time, the compression of the economic 
agents’ liquidities and the uncertain business climate during the transition has 
led to the decrease in the domestic demand for capital goods. 
In 1992, the production decreased by around one fourth compared to 1991 
(and by more than 50 percent compared to 1989) in the chemistry, machinery 
and equipments industries and by around 30 percent (two thirds as compared 
with 1989) in metallurgy, metal constructions, rubber and plastics processing. 
This situation led also to a sharp underutilization of the human and technical 
potential, compared to other industries. The degree of production capacity 
utilization stood at only 10-30 percent for OLTICIT type cars, electric engines, 
synthetic rubber, wagons and of 40-60 percent for tractors, oil processing, and 
finished hot-rolled steel (CNS, 1993). 
Contrary to the continuous decline in the production, these sectors’ share 
in the total value of the industrial output increased, on account of the 
accelerated rise in prices, their level being pushed by high energy intensiveness 
and by raw materials supplies from imports. Although the functioning of these 
industrial sectors entails significant foreign currency amount, they continue to 
represent, at the same time, the main providers for external markets, machinery 
and equipments industries holding more than half of Romania’s exports. 
The industries manufacturing non-food products for consumption have 
been affected mainly by the weakening of internal market absorption power 
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and by the competition of similar imported products. The fall in the 
population’s real incomes led to the allocation of more expenses of the family 
budgets towards food products, to the disadvantage of non-food goods, mainly 
of durable goods. Under these circumstances, most of light industry sectors 
witnessed output drawbacks of around 30 percent in 1992 compared to 1991. 
Table 12 
The structure of industry by main sectors in 1990, 1991, 1992 (%) 
 Manufacturing 
industry 
Extraction 
industry  
Electric and 
thermal energy 
Total industrial production    
1990 86.9 8.2 4.9 
1991 84.8 8.3 6.9 
1992 81.6 7.5 10.9 
Employment     
1990 90.5 6.3 3.2 
1991 99.7 7.3 4.0 
1992 86.8 8.2 5.0 
Average number of employees    
1991 88.1 7.7 4.2 
1992 86.4 8.5 5.1 
Consumption of energy     
1991 84.2 8.4 7.4 
1992 83.7 8.2 8.1 
Consumption of electric power    
1991 68.1 12.3 19.6 
1992 64.5 12.3 23.2 
Consumption of thermal 
power    
1991 83.5 5.5 11.0 
1992 78.7 6.9 14.4 
  Fixed assets    
1990 64.6 12.8 22.6 
1991 65.1 12.7 22.2 
1992 59.1 11.9 29.0 
Investments     
1990 45.3 27.2 27.5 
1991 45.1 25.7 29.2 
1992 44.1 22.0 33.9 
Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1993. 
The distorted development of industrial activities led to certain structural 
changes in industry by the main sectors (Table 12) related to the reflection in 
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costs, on the one hand, of price changes in raw materials and domestic energy 
and from imports, under the conditions of internal prices comparable with 
international ones and of the national currency depreciation, and on the other 
hand, of the wage increase impact. 
The obsolete technological profile of Romania, caused by the high degree 
of physical depreciation of the productive equipments, made the industrial 
enterprises as main source of pollutant emissions, affecting severely the 
environment. 
The study find that, in Romania, the energy prices were typically set at a 
fraction of their world market levels, mainly for domestic resources such as 
coal and electricity, but also for imported resources such as oil and natural gas. 
The composition of industrial output is, therefore, biased towards energy-
intensive activities including chemistry, metallurgy, building materials (Table 
13), while the effective pressure for increasing the fuel utilization effectiveness 
in all industries has been minimal [8]. 
Table 13 
Intensity of energy consumption in some industrial sectors in 1992 (%) 
Industry  100 
Extraction industry 109 
Oil and natural gas extraction 113 
Manufacturing industry 103 
Pulp, paper and cardboard 151 
Crude petroleum processing, coal coking and nuclear fuel 
treatment 179 
Chemistry and synthetic and artificial fibres 267 
Other non-metallic minerals production 161 
Metallurgy  164 
Electric and thermal energy, gas and water 74 
Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1993. 
Only since 1993 the energy prices have tended to be closer to the level of 
world market prices. But industrial enterprises transferred these new high 
prices of energy into the prices of their products, which represent one of the 
main causes of inflation rise. 
Dimensional structure changes 
One of the main structural changes in industry during the transition is 
represented by the increasing share of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
whose capabilities of adapting to the new conditions has already been proved. 
Taking into account the dimensional structure, the defining trait of the 
Romanian industry is gigantism, the average number of employees per 
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enterprise being more than 1,000 persons in 1992 [9]. Though the industrial 
structure has a visible tendency to shift towards smaller type of companies, 
almost one third of the employees in industry are still working in huge 
enterprises, with more than 5,000 employees (Table 14). Just these enterprises, 
favoured in the past by the centralized planning system, represent one of the 
most serious obstacles in the transition to the market economy. 
Table 14 
Classification of industrial enterprises by number of employees  
Number of 
employees 
Number of 
enterprises 
Structure 
(%) 
Total number of 
employees 
Structure 
(%) 
 1989 1992 1989 1992 1989 1992 1989 1992 
Total  2,102 2,920 100.0 100.0 3,690,211 3,032,816 100.0 100.0 
Up to 100 141a 619 6.7a 21.2 18,385a 38,240 0.5a 1.3 
101-200  409  14.0  59,202  2.0 
201-300 395b 285 18.8b 9.8 133,082b 70,912 3.6b 2.3 
301-400  204  7.0  71,070  2.3 
401-500  164  5.6  74,283  2.5 
501-1,000 491 500 23.4 17.1 341,450 358,422 9.3 11.8 
1,001-2,000 471 392 22.4 13.4 627,856 557,405 17.0 18.4 
2,001-3,000 263 170 12.5 5.8 615,909 412,790 16.7 13.6 
3,001-5,000 197 107 9.4 3.7 739,914 410,643 20.0 13.5 
Over 5,000 144 70 6.8 2.4 1,213,615 979,849 32.9 32.3 
a up to 200 
b 201-500 
Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1990, 1993. 
The material and energy inputs being supplied by the state companies at 
favourable price conditions (including those from imports), these huge 
industrial conglomerates, commonly concentrated on industrial platforms, 
stood out for their high levels of energy and material intensiveness and their 
noxious effects on the environment. Having monopoly positions on the internal 
market, they set high selling prices for their products. Though much attenuated 
currently, these characteristics are still persistent. Additionally, their reluctance 
towards privatization, marketization and demonopolization was supported by 
social pressures, among which those of the trade unions played an important 
role. 
The average number of persons employed by an enterprise in 1992, 
compared to industry as a whole (1,039), was much larger in extraction 
industry (8,335), in electric and thermal energy, gas and water, transport and 
distribution (8,286) (Grigorescu and others, 1993). 
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At the level of manufacturing industry, the average number of persons 
employed by an enterprise in 1992 was 935, the highest figures in this sector 
being registered in the following sectors: tobacco (7,905); crude petroleum 
processing, coal coking and nuclear fuel treatment (3,006); metallurgy (2,503); 
road transport means (2,450) and other means of transport (2,499); radio, TV 
sets and communication equipments (1.597); chemistry and synthetic and 
artificial fibres (1,584); medical, precision, optical instruments and equipments 
and watches (1,259); and the lowest ones in the following sectors: publishing 
houses, printing houses and recording on supports (292); food and drinks 
(396); computers and office equipments (428); metallic construction and metal 
products (485); fabrics, furs and leather goods (486); furniture production and 
other non-classified activities (677); footwear (812); textiles and textile 
products (849); rubber and plastics processing (870). 
 
Macro and microeconomic structural adjustments 
 
The transition to the market economy started in Romania in much more 
unfavourable circumstances than in other Eastern and Central European 
countries. Changing the old system in Romania generated more adverse effects 
than in cases where the reform programs had been previously prepared in order 
to achieve the targeted changes. It is worth mentioning that in Romania the 
starting point in the transition race was marked by a considerable gap from the 
viewpoint of the economic development level and of the technological 
background. 
After a period when the self-adjustment forces of the economy were 
relied on too much, it has become obvious that structural adjustments should 
be done in a coordinated way, as far as creating an environment of competition 
and of market forces functioning.  
The controversies of whether the therapy should be shock or gradual 
proved to be superfluous since many changes have taken place spontaneously. 
As a consequence, achieving a market economy’s functional background 
should be accompanied by coherent policies aimed at developments in the real 
economy. 
The setting of priorities, in terms of limited resources, undoubtedly 
represents the most delicate aspect of reforms. One should certainly find a 
system to facilitate the insertion of new mechanisms. At the same time, the 
system should be able to maintain a correction and change control procedure. 
It should be very important that these changes correspond to the market virtues 
and stimulate the economy. The objectives of continuing the reforms mean 
mainly ensuring macroeconomic stabilization, restoring economic and 
financial equilibrium, restructuring the productive capabilities and the 
technological renewal. 
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According to recent developments observed not only in Romania, but also 
in all other ex-communist European countries, it has become obvious that, 
during the transition to a market economy, macroeconomic reform measures 
will be difficult to be achieved since adequate micro-adjustments are missing. 
The intellectual debate focuses more and more upon the importance of finding 
an appropriate mix of macro and micro structural adjustment measures in order 
to accelerate the transition. 
Overview of financial and monetary adjustments 
The high inflation and the foreign currency shortage represented the main 
imbalances over the first years of transition, which have, as mentioned before, 
a structural nature. The macroeconomic stabilization through cautious fiscal, 
monetary, credit and income policies focused on managing inflation and 
restoring external balances are essential prerequisites in continuing reforms. 
Although a basic component of the stabilization policy should be 
demand-side elimination or absorption of excess in liquidity, its long run 
success depends on an adequate supply-side response. The basic trade-off of 
this policy is the supply response provided by a stable monetary unit, real 
prices and an increased efficiency of resources allocation, based on market 
principles. The macroeconomic stabilization could be therefore favoured by 
the creation of circumstances under which microeconomic preconditions are 
established (Mundell, 1991). 
The attempt to tackle the effects rather than the causes of inflation 
encounters additional pressures and raises the costs of measures aimed to curb 
inflation. Undoubtedly, real economic reforms could not be initiated under the 
previous price system. Therefore, prices liberalization has proved necessary as 
a corrective measure. However, because of the mismanagement at the 
macroeconomic level, the corrective inflation is being converted into structural 
inflation. 
The main causes of this type of inflation in Romania are related to the 
following circumstances: 
1. the gradual approach of prices liberalization in order to limit the social 
consequences did not succeed in adjusting demand and supply and in 
bringing prices close to their real level; 
2. the behaviour of economic agents towards excessively rise in their prices 
was initially caused by the monetary overhang and subsequently 
maintained by the quasi-liquidity resulting from the payment arrears; 
3. the delay in restructuring and privatization as well as in implementing 
other measures aimed at achieving the coherence of the reform efforts, 
gave rise to the lack of competition and therefore to the intensification of 
inflationary pressures; 
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4. the lack of correlation between the indexation system and the real 
situation in production and labour productivity led in many cases to 
unjustified increases in wages and implicitly in prices; 
5. the arrears in inter-enterprise payments and the tendency to overstock 
added strong pressures to the inflationary process; 
6. the effects of national currency depreciation were not significant in 
stimulating exports, but induced supplementary pressures on internal 
prices through imports. 
Considering these causes, the policies aimed to curb inflation should 
envisage a set of correlated measures to continue the liberalization of prices on 
the real basis. That means to begin with the energy and raw material prices, 
both internal and imports ones, focusing on the equilibrium exchange rate and 
on the creation of a competitive environment in the economy. This new basis 
of price liberalization, including severe cuts in subsidies, should reveal the 
proper direction of structural adjustments needed according to the real 
comparative advantages of the Romanian economy (see also Note [4]). 
A valid approach of restrictive monetary policy creates favourable 
prerequisites both to reduce inflationary pressures and to stimulate positive 
adjustments. The rigorous control of money supply corresponds to the 
combined goals of reducing the inflation rate, of satisfying normal liquidity 
requirements of the economy and of reaching an adequate money velocity. 
The interest rate policy represents an important tool in addressing the 
allocation of resources and the balance of demand and supply. Under the 
circumstances of structural changes in the economy, this policy should aim 
bringing the interest rate to its positive level, in real terms. It is worth 
mentioning that while the inflation rate exceeded 190 percent in 1991 and 220 
percent in 1992, the average interest rates of commercial banks fluctuated 
between 10-33 percent in 1991 and 15-96 percent in 1992 (Government of 
Romania, 1993a). 
In the absence of a real restructuring - that should have been supported by 
adequate monetary measures in order to address the macroeconomic 
imbalances - the gradual accumulation of inter-enterprise arrears turned into a 
severe financial blockage. The outstanding payments (current and investments) 
at the end of 1991 stood at around lei 1.653 billion, representing 80 percent of 
GNP. The global compensation of payments arrears tried at the end of 1991 
caused the inflation rate to remain at high levels and, as a result of missing 
measures to encourage the financial discipline, the problems created by these 
arrears have continued. More than that, this situation has been worsened by 
economic agents that have accumulated large foreign exchange deposits from 
exports, most of them kept in foreign banks, while failing to pay their debts in 
lei to the domestic suppliers, increasing at the same time pressures on the 
exchange rate and inflation. 
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It is worth pointing out that the financial blockage mostly resulted from 
inadequate structural economic environment: the state-owned enterprises 
continued to produce without adjusting their supply to the real demand, which 
in turn led to stocks of unsold goods. The ratio of stocks in GNP stood at 23.4 
percent in 1991 and at 34 percent in 1992. In other words, around one third of 
the national product was neither consumed nor invested, but instead 
depreciated, under the form of stocks. Moreover, some economic agents 
accumulated deliberately products in stocks with speculative purposes, in order 
to sell or re-sell them at higher prices, obtaining unreasonable profits and 
contributing to the intensification of inflationary pressures (National Bank of 
Romania, 1992). The financial blockage represents the price paid by the 
Romanian society for the structural reluctance to adapt to the new economic 
environment. 
As a consequence, the fight against arrears requires that one give up the 
option of global or selective compensations and adopting measures in order to 
impose a severe financial discipline. Among them, initiating restructuring 
actions at sector and enterprise levels seems to be more important, requiring 
also the drastic intervention of the banking system for the liquidation of 
insolvent economic agents. These steps have at the same time relatively high 
social costs. Obviously, the financial discipline represents one of the main 
challenges facing macroeconomic adjustment and the achievement of 
economic restructuring.  
Recovery and reorientation of exports 
Since 1989, the inadequate structure of the Romanian economy and its 
weak international competitiveness were reflected in a severe reduction of 
exports and in the worsening of the foreign trade balance. With exports per 
capita in 1992 of around $ 200, Romania stood at the lowest position in Europe 
(excluding Albania). Due to the faster decrease in exports than imports during 
the first years of transition, Romania recorded growing deficits in the foreign 
trade balance. In the period 1990-1992, this imbalance between exports and 
imports amounted to about $ 6 billion. It should be mentioned that this trend is 
particular to Romania. Other East European countries (as Hungary) succeeded 
in maintaining external trade balance or even recorded substantial surpluses 
(Poland, for instance recorded a trade surplus amounting to almost $ 7 billion 
in the period 1990-1992) (IMF, 1993). 
However, the year 1992 witnessed a positive trend: exports increased by 
18.6 percent compared to the rise in imports by 10 percent. This reversal trend 
is expected to continue also in 1993. A rise in exports by 6 percent is estimated 
for 1993, while imports should remain at the same level as the previous year. 
Therefore, a slight improvement in the foreign trade balance is expected. The 
share of exports in GDP, after a drastic decrease from 20 percent in 1989 to 
about 15 percent in 1990 and 1991, recovered to 23 percent in 1992. 
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By geographical regions, it should be mentioned that around two thirds of 
total exports had as destination the European countries, among them EU and 
EFTA countries holding more than half of these exports (Table 15). Based on 
recent agreements with the EU and EFTA countries, an increase in foreign 
trade with this region of Europe is expected in the coming years. 
            Table 15 
Structure of Romanian exports by geographical regions (%) 
 1989 1992 1993* 
Europe, of which: 69.2 63.2 64.5 
    - EU 30.6 32.6 38.4 
    - EFTA 3.3 5.6 4.8 
Asia and Africa 21.8 32.5 31.3 
America and Oceania 9.0 4.3 4.2 
* preliminary 
Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook,  
Bucharest, 1993; NCP, 1993. 
 
In the structure of exports by product categories, the main share is held by 
machinery and equipments, transport, basic metals, textiles and textile articles 
(Table 16). The fall in industrial output during 1990-1993 mainly due to the 
collapse of the CMEA market is reflected in exports by the sharp decrease in 
the share of machinery and electric equipments and transport means, 
respectively from 30 percent to 17 percent. In 1990-1993, exports witnessed a 
favourable trend of structural changes shown by the decrease of mineral 
products’ share (including fuels) from 20 percent to 13 percent. 
 
Table 16 
Exports and imports structure by product categories (%) 
 Exports (FOB) Imports (CIF) 
 1990 1992 1993* 1990 1992 1993* 
Total, of which: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Mineral products (including fuels) 19.3 13.3 13.1 42.4 32.1 34.1 
Basic metals and articles 16.2 17.1 21.9 5.7 4.5 - 
Chemical and connected products 5.1 9.7 7.5 7.2 7.0 - 
Machinery and electric 
equipments, transport means 29.2 21.4 17.2 21.5 18.2 20.0 
Textiles and textile articles 9.8 10.6 15.8 2.9 9.5 - 
Food products, beverages, tobacco  0.4 1.1 - 4.3 7.4 6.0 
* preliminary 
Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, Bucharest, 1993; CNP, 
1993. 
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However, the composition of exports showed higher proportions of raw 
materials, energy-intensive products, and also products with a large content of 
natural resources. It is worth mentioning that, according to the industrial 
classification by industrial sectors, around three quarters of the total exports 
were provided by chemistry and oil refining industries, machinery and 
equipments, metallurgy and wood processing.  
Obviously, the inappropriate industrial structure, the weak performances 
of the Romanian enterprises, the significant distortions in the price system and 
the lack of stability of the foreign exchange market all affected in a negative 
manner the extent and the competitiveness of exports. 
Within the structure of imports prevails the mineral products, mainly raw 
materials, whose share however decreased from 43 percent in 1990 to 34 
percent in 1993. A relevant structural change in imports’ composition consist 
in the increase of consumption goods’ share (textiles, food products, etc.) from 
7 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 1992. The internal market shortage of those 
products, mainly due to agricultural and industrial output decrease and to the 
deepening of structural imbalances in these sectors was covered by imports. 
The adverse reciprocal effects of the foreign trade and the exchange rate 
should be mentioned. Under the circumstances of economic structural 
imbalances, of the fall in industrial output and exports and of the depletion of 
foreign currency reserves, strong pressures on the exchange rate surged. 
Obviously, maintaining an over-appreciated national currency, as before 1990, 
not only proved to be ineffective in slowing the prices rise, but also entailed 
decreasing exports and increasing imports, which led to the deterioration of the 
trade balance and to finance its deficit by raising external borrowings.  
Despite repeated depreciations of the national currency under the 
monitoring of the central bank, the positive effects did not emerge. Thus, on 
the one hand, the demand of foreign currency for imports could not be covered 
due to the decrease in foreign currency supply and, on the other hand many 
earnings from exports did not enter the official foreign exchange market [10]. 
The desirable alternative for increasing exports and the related foreign 
currency earnings is to improve their competitiveness by reducing the unit 
costs, technological renewal and more efficient use of resources. A more 
detailed examination of Romania’s external competitiveness would require 
analytical data on exports and imports of different sectors and products and 
also comparable conditions of prices or, at least, a real level of the exchange 
rate. Even for estimating basic indicators of the export-import prices 
relationships (terms of trade for instance) the required information is missing 
[11]. 
An essential task of the decision-makers consist in identifying those 
sectors which could bring the highest contribution to the national income, 
assessed at competitive i.e. world market prices, referring to the inputs of 
domestic resources such as the capital and labour that they require. This means 
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that, in the future, macroeconomic management decisions should be based on 
an assessment of the value-added and profitability of each sector considering 
the world market prices. The standard methods for calculating the value-added 
by each industry at world prices and thus the domestic resources cost (DRC) of 
production are well known and conceptually simple. The key requirements are 
for information regarding the composition of inputs and the ratio between 
world and domestic prices for both inputs and outputs. Data on the 
composition of inputs into production could be provided by a disaggregated 
input-output table (Hare and Huges, 1991). 
It became obvious that the structural adjustments of the Romanian 
economy have not been supported by the foreign trade. In order to reverse this 
situation, it is worth designing a well articulated framework based on viable 
incentives to exporters: the extension of a ‘drawback’ system; adequate 
instruments for exports financing and also for insurance and guarantees for 
export credits according to international rules; reduction in the profit tax due 
for exported goods and services; improvements in the conditions of access to 
external markets supported by governmental agreements; providing 
information concerning the international environment and business 
opportunities; trade facilities and reference prices on different external 
markets; readjustments to the level of nominal tariff protection; and gradual 
reduction of tariff levels according to the needs of the economy and exports 
recovery and for increasing competition on the domestic market. The 
immediate purpose of exports promoting measures consists in the reduction in 
pressures on the exchange rate and of supporting viable sectors, able to 
successfully compete on external markets. 
The structural adjustments of the national economy, based on appropriate 
measures in developing foreign trade, are undoubtedly related to the principle 
of international specialization. This requires viable convertors which should 
transmit real signals in order to address the allocation of resources in the 
economy by the economic agents.  
Macroeconomic instruments and adjustments such as a realistic exchange 
rate, the mitigation of price instability and the elimination of distortions from 
their structure are fundamental preconditions of a coherent restructuring. 
Privatization process and development of the private sector 
Obviously, one of the basic changes in order to make operational the 
market forces should be the reform of property rights [12]. This could also 
change the behaviour of economic agents and population, which represents a 
psychological impact. 
In Romania, this issue involves two aspects. On the one hand, is it the 
privatization of industrial state-owned enterprises, among these, some being 
very large, with ten of thousands of workers. On the other hand, is it the 
private sector, emerging almost solely by its own forces. These two aspects are 
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not particular to Romania, but in Romania the critical situation of the economy 
brings supplementary difficulties which slowed the privatization rate. Based on 
certain assumptions (about $ 300 million foreign capital and prevalent internal 
investments) the privatization of Romanian companies is estimated as possible 
during a period of 17 years (Zaman, 1993). Up to mid 1993, two years after 
issuing the Privatization Law, out of 6,300 companies only 150 were sold. 
However, some progress has been made in developing the private sector, 
its contribution to the GDP creation increasing from 16 percent in 1990 to 21 
percent in 1991 and to 26 percent in 1992, mainly due to agriculture - by the 
abolition of the cooperative sector - and to commercial services and retail sales 
(Table 17). The poorest results, from this viewpoint, have been recorded in 
industry, where the private sector held only 1.1 percent of total industrial 
production in 1992 (compared to agriculture, for example, where this sector 
represented 70.8 percent of total production). 
  Table 17 
Share of the private sector in Romanian economy (%) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993a 1994b 
GDP 16.0 21.0 26.0 30.0 34.0 
Industrial production - 1.1 1.1 - - 
Agricultural production 56.1 79.3 70.8 - - 
        Vegetal production 56.0 81.6 67.2 - - 
        Animal production 56.3 74.8 75.2 - - 
Commercial services 3.3 25.1 40.2 43 - 
Retail sales 0.8 21.3 44.4 50 60 
Exports  0.3 19.8 28.0 - - 
Imports  0.7 17.5 34.6 - - 
Investments (including 
population’s own investments) 4.3 8.1 15.6 20 - 
     a preliminary 
     b forecast 
    Source: National Commission for Prognosis, 1993. 
The foreign capital share in the Romanian economy has increased, even 
to a lesser extent than expectations. According to data provided by the 
Romanian Agency for Development, at the end of 1992 the number of 
companies with foreign capital increased more than three times as compared to 
the previous year (21,056 against 6,493 in December 1991), while the capital 
in foreign currency doubled ($ 543.6 million against $ 267 million). The 
concentration degree of the companies with foreign capital is nevertheless very 
high: about 0.3 percent out of total number of these companies covered 68 
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percent of the capital invested, while 96 percent of the total number held only 
13 percent of the capital (National Commission for Statistics, 1993). 
Positive effects of the growing private sector upon creating new jobs, 
accumulating capital, increasing the income sources for the state budget, 
contributing also to the recovery of economic activities could already be 
observed. Preliminary data for 1993 show a contribution of about 30 percent of 
the private sector to the creation of GDP, 43 percent in commercial services to 
population, 50 percent in retail sales, 20 percent in investments. The 
estimations of the National Commission for Prognosis for 1994 foresee a 
private sector’s share of 34 percent in GDP and 60 percent in retail sales, 
without considering the effects of ‘large privatization’ process (NCP, 1993). 
It is expected that, in a short period of time, the employment structure on 
sectors will be subject to sensible changes. Among the factors which could 
drive the new structural configuration of employment an important role will be 
played by the rate and the concrete forms of privatization [13]. The changes in 
the nature of property are expected to have a major impact on the functioning 
of the labour market. By changing the ownership, significant shifts in the 
qualification profile and structure of employment are expected also to occur. 
The state sector’s share in total employment decreased from 66.9 percent 
in 1991 to 56.2 percent in 1993 and expected to 52.3 percent in 1994, while the 
share of the private sector increased from 2.5 percent of total employment in 
1991 to 6.4 percent in 1993 and expected to 9.7 percent in 1994 (Table 18). 
Table 18 
Employment structure (end of year) (%) 
 1991 1992 1993a 1994b 
Total employment, of which: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    Total employees 69.4 63.4 62.6 62.0 
        State sector 66.9 59.0 56.2 52.3 
        Private sector 2.5 4.4 6.4 9.7 
    Other categories of employment,  
of which: 30.6 36.6 37.4 38.0 
       Owners and partners 3.8 36.6 37.4 38.0 
       Workers on their own account 22.3 25.3 25.4 25.7 
        Unpaid family workers  4.5 5.6 6.1 6.2 
a preliminary 
b estimation 
Source: National Commission for Prognosis, 1993. 
 In terms of the improvements in capital and economic profitability, the 
private sector proved to be more efficient than the state one. Much more 
adaptive to the new market circumstances, the private sector in the Romanian 
 33
economy had good economic and financial performance, though they had a 
modest capital (Table 19). 
Table 19 
Profitability by ownershipa (%) 
 1992 1993b 1993c 1994d 
National economy 5.4 4.6 5.1 5.5 
State property 2.7 2.4 2.9 3.3 
Private property  11.3 11.1 12.7 13.0 
a calculated as ratio between profits  and production costs 
b six months 
c preliminary 
d forecast 
Source: National Commission for Prognosis, 1993. 
If at the beginning of the transition, private activities initiated more in retail 
sales and commercial services, starting with 1993 they were also significant in 
productive sectors (industry, agriculture, construction) beginning to bring a 
substantial contribution to the state budget revenues. In this regard, the 
acceleration of privatization will undoubtedly foster the stabilization and 
recovery of the national economy. 
The privatization of about 6,300 state-owned companies in a period of 
seven years requires a complex macroeconomic and financial strategy, carried 
out by a coordinated activity of government institutions. As a first estimation, 
the state should offer yearly for sale shares of around lei 530 billion. However, 
the domestic private capital available in the same period is estimated to lei 200 
billion yearly (Government of Romania, 1993a; Croitoru, 1993). The 
difference between the capital committed to sale and the available one for 
acquisitions could harm the ownership reform rate, in the absence of an 
adequate managerial program, especially if the external financial sources 
(credits, direct or portfolio investments) would be maintained at low levels. 
Consequently, a long-term financial strategy should focus on the 
attraction of large investors (private or institutional, internal or external) and, 
at the same time, of small savings, as essential premises for the development of 
institutions and financial market and fostering privatization. Therefore, the 
institutions entitled to state-owned companies’ privatization will have to assess 
the potential investors’ behaviour and to channel the investment demand 
towards above mentioned aims. At the same time, the annual privatization 
program, both in structure and volume, and through optimal forms of property 
transfer, have to be elaborated as properly as possible from an economic 
viewpoint. 
As regards the state-owned companies which are to be privatized 
according to the Privatization Law (Government of Romania, 1993a; Tribuna 
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Economica, 1991) should be mentioned the high shares in main indicators 
(such as social capital, the number of employees, total sales) of the industry 
and of the big companies (except for trade and food industry) (Table 20). 
Table 20 
State-owned companies to be privatized (End 1992) ( %)                     
Companies 
by sector 
and size 
Number 
of 
companies 
Social 
capital 
Number 
of 
employees 
Total 
sales 
Total 
sales/social 
capital 
Profit/social 
capital 
Profit/ 
total 
sales 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 62.5 2.9 4.6 
     Large  11.3 77.2 44.3 39.7    
     Medium 39.1 20.1 43.4 46.7    
     Small 49.6 2.7 12.3 13.6    
Industry* 27.4 51.5 49.6 39.7 48.2 3.6 7.4 
     Large 3.6 42.1 18.6 27.2    
     Medium 18.1 9.0 29.2 11.6    
     Small 5.7 0.4 1.8 0.9    
Agriculture 27.8 29.0 12.4 9.8 21.1 0.2 1.0 
     Large 6.0 26.3 3.9 2.0    
     Medium 1.8 2.0 2.3 6.3    
     Small  20.0 0.7 6.2 1.5    
Food 
industry 6.4 4.5 7.2 8.5 118.3 5.7 4.8 
     Large  0.4 1.1 1.0 0.8    
     Medium  2.6 3.2 4.6 7.3    
     Small  3.4 0.2 1.6 0.4    
Transport  6.3 5.9 3.0 2.5 26.1 0.3 1.2 
     Large  0.3 4.7 0.8 1.3    
     Medium  2.4 0.9 1.4 0.7    
     Small  3.6 0.3 0.8 0.5    
Construction  7.6 3.0 7.9 5.6 114.8 6.1 5.3 
     Large  0.5 1.7 2.5 2.0    
     Medium  4.0 1.2 4.5 3.0    
     Small  3.1 0.1 0.9 0.6    
Trade               10.3 2.2 13.9 19.7 563.6 12.9 2.3 
     Large  0.1 0.8 0.9   1.5    
    Medium 5.2 1.0 8.9 10.1    
     Small 5.0 0.4 4.1 8.1    
  Tourism  2.1 1.4 0.8 0.7 33.2 3.5 10.5 
      Large 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.2    
     Medium 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.4    
     Small 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1    
* excluding food industry 
Source: Own calculations based on State Property Fund data and Croitoru (1993). 
Among the privatization criteria should be considered: the dimension of 
enterprise profitability; the essential sector changes in the transition process; 
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regional criterion; degree of monopolization, etc. Out of these, of a particular 
importance stands the dimensional criteria, according to which the acceleration 
of ‘large privatization’ which is supposed to break the monopolies of the big 
state-owned enterprises and to increase the market forces presence in the 
economy and the adaptability of the labour force, as well as management 
performances, will be decisive for the success of transition in Romania. 
Investment challenges 
Under the circumstances of difficulties entailed by the transition to the 
market economy - economic instability and crisis - since 1990 there has been a 
drastic cut of financial resources for investments in the whole Romanian 
economy, together with a redefinition of the state targets, in relation to those of 
the economic agents. Due to this natural development, investments started and 
remained unfinished before 1989 have turned into a problem with major 
economic and social implications. 
The initial imbalance between needs and resources has been deteriorated 
in the last three years because of the lack of a clear strategic concept and of a 
coherent criteria for setting investment priorities, by sector allocation of 
resources, independently of the restructuring course and economy 
modernization and by an excessive dispersion of investment on a wide front of 
objectives with uncertain economic returns and having long implementation 
deadlines. 
One of the main crisis impacts, affecting the general stability of the 
economic and social background is the drastic cut in investments at the level of 
national economy. Contributing to this, alongside a lower propensity of 
economic agents towards saving and investing, have been: 
1. Dysfunctions in the economic system (low level of clearing off, 
financing production without demand, financial blockage, faulty 
operations in the banking system, etc.): 
2. Lower potentialities of the state budget for financing unfinished 
investment objectives and for starting new projects; 
3. Scarcity of foreign exchange, in the context of the predominant 
channelling of foreign financial assistance for covering some needs 
of intermediary and final consumption and the relatively slow rate in 
the increase in foreign direct investments. 
Consequently, boosting investments and improving their effectiveness is 
an essential reference point in the restructuring, together with emergency 
measures for clearing the economy of obsolete enterprises. Moreover, 
increasing investments could help the unemployment slow down by balancing 
the redundancy-new jobs ratio. 
The structural adjustments investment policy should start from the 
distinction between the sectors where the only efficient regulating force is the 
market and those to which the state should maintain a direct intervention. 
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Considering their role in the vital functions of the economy during transition, 
governmental interventions should prove necessary in reorganizing and 
modernizing certain sectors as: the power sector, including the production of 
primary energy sources and power distribution; transportation and 
communications infrastructure; land improvement, water management and 
environment protection; development of public infrastructure; scientific 
research, education and health care, culture and arts, social assistance. 
In the coming years specific actions to foster the investment potential of 
economic agents and, as a consequence, the restructuring process, would be 
essential. The strengthening and mobilization of the investment capabilities of 
the companies could be achieved by the expected impact of economic 
stabilization on the increase in investments and the recovery of medium and 
long term credits, by the adoption of an up-to-date and flexible fixed capital 
depreciation system and also by the creation of a legal and institutional 
framework adequate to encourage the fast development of the capital market. 
The stimulation of direct foreign investments in priority areas oriented 
towards exports and competitive on foreign markets, in the financial-banking 
sector (by setting up financial institutions specialized in investments and 
leasing) as well as in sectors of public interest (transportation, 
communications, communal services, etc.) represent an essential prerequisite 
for economic restructuring on a new technological basis. To this end, measures 
are taken into consideration in order to increase the confidence of potential 
investors (attenuation of macroeconomic instability, implementation of clear 
and complete regulation on property, updating the economic/trade 
agreements), to a better knowledge of the Romanian economic potential in 
foreign business environment, including the direct promotion of priority 
investment projects and also to support the Romanian investors in cooperation 
agreements and contracting credits and/or other forms of foreign financial 
assistance. 
An important change in investment flows orientation is induced by the 
European integration, with a view to catch the significant gap and to improve 
the general framework of economic and social activities in Romania. The 
actions to be undertaken are aimed to stimulate and support, with priority, 
those investments which bring the infrastructures closer to the European 
standards, improve the quality of the services offered in these fields, and help 
maintaining the ecological balance. 
Another main component of the investments policy consists in the 
decentralization and strengthening the capability of intervention of local 
governments for the improvement of urban facilities, by setting an appropriate 
framework for collecting and engagement of financial resources. In this respect 
the Romanian Parliament should adopt the adequate regulations for the further 
increase in the local budgets autonomy and encourage the participation of 
economic agents and population in financing public works of local interest. 
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The Romanian Government investment policy focuses on achieving 
objectives of public interest, mainly those directly supporting the economic 
and social reforms, contributing decisively to the rise in the mobility of labour, 
capital and information, involving an increased volume of private investments 
and strengthening the private sector, mainly in activities with high competitive 
potential on foreign markets, demonopolizing economic sectors and activities, 
reducing the area of state monopolies, turning the state-owned companies into 
private ones and ensuring a real social protection for the population 
(Government of Romania, 1993b). 
Conclusions  
The main conclusions of this study could be summarized as follows: 
1. Under unfavourable circumstances of external and internal adverse 
effects on the Romanian economy in the first years of transition, 
inherited structural distortions have been worsened and new ones 
have emerged. 
2. The discrepancy between the rate of implementing reforms and the 
strong forces of inertia hindered the positive structural adjustments 
to a real market economy. 
3. The incoherence of measures taken towards the implementation of 
market mechanisms has diminished the expected positive effects on 
the Romanian economy’s structural changes. In the absence of an 
adequate outline for demonopolization and privatization, the price 
liberalization did not succeed in sending real signals for an efficient 
reallocation of resources and, as consequence, structural imbalances 
between demand and supply have deepened. 
4. The fall in industrial activity and its poor restructuring, due to the 
dominant position of this sector, has pushed the whole economy into 
a severe crisis. Significant changes proved not possible under 
structural rigidities favoured by the monopolistic positions of large 
enterprises, mainly in heavy industry and by the social pressures of 
the strong trade unions. As a consequence, the real incentives to 
foster structural adjustments towards improving energy and material 
consumption efficiency were missing. 
5. The sharpening of financial and monetary imbalances 
(hyperinflation, negative real interest rates, sharp depreciation of the 
national currency, foreign trade and budget deficits, financial 
blockages and arrears) expressed the weak reaction of the real 
economy to the macroeconomic policy stimulus, which proved to be 
inadequate in relation to Romania’s structure specific issues. 
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Obviously, managing transition requires more rigorous attention to the 
correlation in time between the steps of reform measures. As we tried to show, 
the success of the transition to the market economy in Romania depends 
decisively on the accuracy of structural adjustments and on the adequacy of the 
reforms program support, including financial one, both from domestic and 
external sources. 
Notes  
1. Nevertheless, the analysis of data shows some positive trends. The 
share of tertiary sector in GDP partially depends on the real 
development of different services, among these banking and 
financial services being of a particular importance. It is worth 
mentioning that in the last decades these services registered the 
fastest growth in the developed world. Even if in the case of 
Romania banking and finance services are not yet really developed, 
their expansion is however significant. In 1992, these services 
contribution to the GDP stood at 5 percent, holding around 15 
percent of the tertiary sector. 
2. Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 
Bucharest, 1993. 
3. There are important reasons why politicians and the general public 
should be concerned about the rise and the size of the hidden 
economy in the former communist countries: 
a. The out-of-control development of the hidden (informal) 
economy, in a latent form existing even in the former regime, 
occurred after the general liberalization of economic activities. 
This was favoured by the legislation vacuum, ambiguous 
regulations and the wrong way of translating them into practice 
and also by the quasi-generalized state-owned sector. 
b. Under a growing hidden economy, economic policy is based on 
unreal ‘official’ indicators (like unemployment, official labour 
force, income, consumption), which, to say the least, could be 
wrong in magnitude. In such a situation a prospering hidden 
economy may cause severe difficulties to decision makers, 
because it ‘provides’ unreliable official indicators, the accuracy 
of intended policy measures being therefore doubtful. 
c. A continuous increase in the size of the hidden economy, caused 
many times by a rise in the overall burden of taxes and 
regulations, could lead to an erosion of the tax base (the Laffer 
curve principle), a decrease in tax revenues and, consequently, to  
further increases in the budget deficit. 
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These growing concerns (among which the last two are encountered 
also in the Western countries) have led many economists to 
challenging tasks of measuring the size and growth rate of the 
hidden economy, to trace back its main causes and to analyze the 
interactions between the official and unofficial economies. There are 
many methods in the literature to estimate indirectly the size and 
growth of the hidden economy. Among these we have utilized a 
developed model of the Laffer curve for estimating the size and the 
growth rate of unregistered (by official statistical data) economy in 
Romania (Albu, 1993). The analysis of the available data for 1990-
1992 based on this model resulted in the following two 
complementary econometrical functions for estimation: 
Yn = at4 + bt³ + ct² 
Yr = Y – (at4 + bt³ + ct²) 
with the bundle-relationship Y = Yn + Yr = constant (1433.8 billion 
lei, constant prices 1990), where:  
 
Y            - total GDP; 
Yn          - unregistered GDP (created in the hidden economy); 
Yr         - registered GDP (‘official’ GDP) 
t         - tax ratio (percentage of GDP); 
a, b, c   - parameters 
(a = + 0.0575274/100; b = -5.7278647/100; c = +180.81292/100) 
 
Our calculations show a rise in the share of unregistered GDP in the 
total GDP from 41.1 percent in 1990 to 56.7 percent in 1992, 
corresponding to the increase in the tax ratio (in real terms) from 
32.8 percent to 45.5 percent. This model could perhaps provide a 
better explanation of the severe fall in the official registered GDP 
than the strict economic interpretations. We consider that the current 
migration of economic activities from the visible zone to the 
invisible zone in Romania has been caused by the inappropriate 
budgetary policy, based mainly on the rise in the taxation ratio level, 
under the circumstances of a weak government bonds market and a 
high inflation. This subject was largely debated in recent literature 
by authors as Mundell (1990) and McCallum (1990). 
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4. Any attempt to analyze the economic development faces, as a 
particular unknown, the real impact on the environment. The extent 
of this impact is assumed to be significant. In the case of Germany, 
for instance, in terms of conventionally measured GDP, the damages 
on the environment were estimated to have been reach 6 percent of 
GDP in 1985 (OECD, 1992). For Poland, this impact was assessed at 
10 percent of GDP annually (Wilczynski, 1990). At the same time, 
the costs of reducing pollution are huge. Researches have shown that 
the introduction of carbon taxes in order to limit carbon emissions 
could lead to losses up to 5 percent of the world GDP (World 
Energy Council, 1993). Some countries made methodological efforts 
to evaluate the “green GDP”, respectively the level of GDP “cleaned 
off” of the negative impact on environment. France and Norway, for 
example, have a certain advantage in this respect, achieving already 
remarkable results (OECD, 1992). 
        The essential issue consists in the inadequate reflection in the goods 
prices of the real costs of environmental protection, of the damages 
induced by various pollutants and of the scarcity of natural 
resources. In the case of Romania, the price distortions from this 
viewpoint have a specific magnitude. For instance, the price of 
timber delivered to the wood industry is about twelve times lower 
than the average price in Europe (World Bank, 1992). The initial 
distortions of energy and raw materials prices are amplified in 
further phases of processing activities. On the one hand, for this 
reason, at different levels of production, an artificially comparative 
advantage of Romanian exports could appear. On the other hand, the 
undervaluation of natural resources discourages the development of 
energy-saving technologies, the conservation of environment and the 
improvements in resources utilization effectiveness. 
5. According to some estimation, the expected falls in industrial output 
and GDP in Romania during the transition would be 20 – 34 percent 
and respectively 10 – 17 percent (Linotte, 1992). By now, statistical 
data show higher falls than these figures. In another study (Albu, 
1991), utilizing a long-run model for structural changes, we find an 
asymptotic value of industry’s share of around 20 percent of the total 
employment. According to Winieki (1991), the output fall in the 
transition economies was predictable because: 1) it corresponds to 
the loss of nonexistent output; 2) it reflects the imposition of hard 
budget constraints; 3) suppliers are obliged to search for customers. 
Other authors show that, during transition, the economy 
performances follow a J curve, as an effect of exogenous factors 
(among the most important being the CMEA collapse) (Brada and 
King, 1991). 
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6. The value of Spearman’s ranks correlation coefficient calculated by 
us stood at R = -0.1459829, showing a certain inverse correlation 
(but having a relative weak intensity). Also, to the linear function 
estimated based on the least-squares method (Y = -3.9457905x + 
1799.5856, where Y represents the index of prices and x the index of 
production) corresponds a variation coefficient v = 37.8 percent. 
Essential for our study is the evidence of a negative correlation 
between the index of prices and the index of production. 
7. Demonopolization and prices deregulation represent two important 
issues in the industrial restructuring. Analyzing the economic agents 
behaviour during the transition period, Jackson showed that the 
expected response to price-quantity decontrol is not only the result 
of how much distortion there was in the previous system and the 
disequilibrium related to the transition, but also by the responses of 
economic agents. So, there are many differences between the 
reaction of private agents to price-quantity decontrol and that of the 
state-owned enterprises. Moreover, decontrol was not restricted to 
prices and quantities, but also to the right to engaging in businesses, 
which, except for a few specifically excluded areas, was extended to 
all categories of agents, existing SOEs (and old style “cooperatives”) 
and private agents, both domestic and foreign (Jackson, 1993). The 
factors that should govern the responses of private agents could be 
rather easily identified, but dealing with the responses of the 
extending SOEs raises other considerations. 
8. Compared to the national economy level, the intensity of output 
energy consumption in industry was higher as follows: 1.22 times in 
1989; 1.23 times in 1990; 1.16 times in 1991. Also, the intensiveness 
of energy consumption of GVA in industry was higher: 1.42 times in 
1989; 1.44 times in 1990; 1.54 times in 1991; 1.41 times in 1992 
(Source: Own calculations based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 
Bucharest, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993). 
9. Referring to the structural distortions in Eastern European 
economies, Jackson wrote: “According to comparisons of enterprises 
in Yugoslavia, Hungary, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia with those 
in the U.K. and Italy at 3-digit branch level, the average employment 
in the former was 10 times greater than in the latter. This reflected 
very much the absence of small – and medium-sized enterprises in 
the former economies. Another important comparison is the extent 
of concentration. Comparisons show Polish and Czechoslovak 
manufacturing to be much more concentrated than in the West. 
Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s concentration in Central and 
Eastern Europe was steadily increasing” (Jackson, 1993). The 
empirical evidence shows the presence of these features also in the 
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case of the Romania. Another issue is the difference between Eastern 
and Western Europe concerning the available data: common data for 
the former regards the enterprises, which can have more than one 
subordinate establishment, whereas for the latter data are commonly 
reported by establishment. Because the size of enterprises commonly 
varies according to the industry branch, it is important to compare 
the intra-industrial sectors. That is why we attempted a deeper 
analysis of the industry structure in this study. 
10. According to the central bank regulations concerning the foreign 
exchange flows, starting with June 1992 exporters were allowed to 
keep all export earnings in convertible currency. At the same time, 
for each export, a compulsory statement specifying the date of 
external payment has been set, by which the exporter committed to 
bring his foreign exchange earnings into Romanian bank accounts. 
But the behaviour of exporters was somehow else than expected. In 
fact, they did not respect their commitment, keeping their export 
earnings in foreign banks. It should be pointed out, however, that 
this behaviour was fuelled by the fear that foreign currency 
regulations would be changed and also by the volatility of the 
foreign exchange market. The total amount of export earnings held 
by Romanian economic agents in foreign banks was unofficially 
estimated to about 800 million US $ by the end of 1993. This had an 
adverse effect also on the foreign exchange market conducted by the 
National Bank of Romania, whose share in the total foreign 
exchange transactions was estimated at only 20 percent. The highest 
share is held by the inter-enterprise transactions i.e., the “grey 
market”. The exchange rate level on this market was estimated 
between 1300-1400 lei per US $ before the end of 1993, while the 
official rate stood at around 1100 lei per US $. It should be also 
mentioned the impact of the parallel black foreign currency market 
where, at the same time, the exchange rate level stood at around 
1700 lei per US $. Otherwise, these distortions of the foreign 
exchange market added supplementary pressures on internal prices. 
11. The most recent input-output table for the Romanian economy 
referred to the year 1990. 
12. An analytical study concerning the progress of reforms in Central 
and East-European countries (including Romania) was presented by 
Wouter Biesbrouchk and Marvin Jackson within the PHARE-ACE 
project on Analytical Challenges in Restructuring Post-Communist 
Economies (Biesbrouck and Jackson, 1995). 
13. Another important structural aspect for the developing private sector 
in Romania is the ratio between the private economic agents resulted 
by the conversion of the state-owned enterprises (including old 
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“cooperatives”) and those newly emerged. The large number of 
state-owned enterprises or their establishments (that made losses or 
failed to maximize profits) could be an important barrier to the 
emergence of new private companies, even if they do not drain 
potential investment funds through state subsidies. This is the result 
of the competition between profit-maximizers and non-profit-
maximizers that show the latter can remain in the economy for a 
long time, even without external assistance. 
The development of a newly emerged private sector in Romania 
should prove extremely important, being a lot of empty “economic 
space” for small and medium sized enterprises, unlikely to be filled 
by the state-owned enterprises or their establishments. Therefore, in 
Romania, as in the other Eastern Europe countries, restructuring 
depend much more on setting new companies than is the typical case 
in developed countries (Jackson, 1993). So, for instance, while the 
data for Western Europe and the US show little change as a result of 
a net increase in the number of companies, the gross entry and exit 
are both very important (Geroski, 1992). Since 1989, there has been 
a fast setting up of new companies in Romania: the net increase in 
the number of private companies stood at 127,995 in 1991 and at 
168,753 in 1992. At the same time, the net increase in the number of 
state enterprises was 1,545 in 1991 and 455 in 1992, and 
respectively, in the number of cooperatives 1,289 in 1991 and 3,538 
in 1992 (Government of Romania, 1993a). 
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